This paper surveys the economic literature on simple policy rules and analyzes econometric methods used to estimate them, emphasizing effects of model misspecification. We draw attention to inconsistencies in evaluation of the rules and implications for policy advice, which is commonly done based on benchmark rules that could be improperly estimated, or selected for a wrong reason.
Introduction
In recent years, evaluation of simple policy rules has become one of the most common exercises in the economic literature, especially since the publication of John Taylor's paper in 1993. 1 Taylor demonstrated that a simple reaction function, later known as a Taylor rule, with a policy instrument (a short-term interest rate) responding to movements in fundamental variables (inflation and output gap), follows closely the observed path of the Federal Funds
Rate in the U.S. in the late 80s and early 90s.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the research on policy rules and, more importantly, on their use as a basis for policy recommendations. As Blinder (1997) notes:
"having looked at monetary policy from both sides now, I can testify that central banking in practice is as much art as science. Nonetheless, while practicing this dark art, I have always found the science quite useful." First, our paper seems to be the first one in the literature that surveys the economic literature on simple policy rules, how they have been used, and most importantly, how they can be potentially misused. We do this by discussing the original Taylor rule and its modifications, and then documenting its uses in theoretical and empirical papers, as well as its possible abuses. These abuses consist of policy advice based on the benchmark rules either selected for wrong reasons or incorrectly estimated.
This paper does not represent a criticism to the simple policy rules literature, but rather it draws attention to inconsistencies in their evaluation, and to how one formulates policy advice. The potential shortcomings of the simple policy rules, have already been documented in disparate papers in the in theoretical and empirical literature.
The second contribution of our paper is testing the econometrical techniques used to estimate the policy rules. Studies that estimate the monetary policy in the US in the last two decades suggest very different interpretations of the same policy making process and all propose plausible stories, supported by econometric indications of a good fit, various historical evidence, and quotes from policy makers speeches. Some add lagged interest rate to a list of monitored fundamentals, some not; some base policy rule on expectations rather than observed values; and some use real-time rather than ex post estimates of fundamentals.
This simple fact has led us to question some of the methods used in this line of research, as well as some policy recommendations based on rules estimated with these methods. We do a
Monte-Carlo exercise, simulating a simple macroeconomic model where there is no uncertainty related to monetary policy setting, and monetary policy is assumed to be conducted according to a very specific and simple rule. Obtained data from simulations, for inflation, output gap and interest rate are used later to estimate monetary policy setting (short term interest rates) by using ordinary least squares and generalized method of moments.
The evaluation of monetary policy reaction functions is very much like a search for a black cat in a dark room, not knowing whether it is there for sure. 2 In our paper, we look for a 2 In fact, Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve Board chairman, mentioned in many occasions that simple formal rules are inadequate as either descriptions or prescriptions for policy at crucial points, like those in recent US policy history. These remarks were made most recently at the American Economic Association (AEA) meetings, in January 2004, and at a recent symposium sponsored by the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank, at Jackson Hole, August 2003.
cat in a bright lit room, and yet as our results suggest, we cannot distinguish it from a dog or an elephant!
In our simulations we use a very specific Taylor rule, based solely on lagged values of output gap and inflation. However, our estimates suggest that the monetary policy setting could be characterized by a forward looking rule or by a rule with other variables present in it (such as lagged interest rate, output gap growth, inflation differential). Assuming the presence of the real time error or using shorter sample it does not change much these outcomes. Both OLS and GMM estimations produce rather similar results. Thus, our exercise suggests that the methods commonly used by the researchers, are not a sufficiently good equipment, if the model is misspecified.
Overall, we argue that there may be "too big" conclusions drawn based on "too little"
evidence, if the estimation of the simple policy reaction functions is not thorough enough. As monetary policy rules are widely used these days to gauge policy makers, 3 improper recommendations made on their basis could be harmful. Thus, it becomes very important to ensure the awareness of the drawbacks of the estimation of such rules and how much judgment is necessary for policy advice, even when employing sound techniques and widely used models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the uses and abuses of the Taylor rule; section 3 describes our simulations and results; and section 4 concludes.
Taylor Rules: Uses And Abuses
This section surveys the uses of monetary policy rules, in particular Taylor rules for closed economies, as well as their potential abuses. Most of the literature referenced here applies to analysis of the monetary policy in the United States, being by far the most studied monetary policy decision process. However, the conclusions of this paper apply to other countries as well, and especially to less developed countries. In those cases policy advice should be even more judgment based, since the empirical literature could be much more scarce, and the potential for having a misspecified model could be larger, given major structural breaks and common "stop and go" policies.
The Taylor Rule and its Modifications
A monetary policy rule expresses the central bank instrument, a short term interest rate, as an explicit function of information available to the central bank. Most of the literature focuses on simple rules, where the instrument is a function of a small subset of the information.
The best known simple instrument rule is the Taylor rule, where the instrument rate responds only to inflation and output gap. Taylor (1993) suggested a simple rule that could explain the monetary policy setting for the early years of Alan Greenspan's chairmanship, 1987-1992. If one looks at the actual federal funds rate path and the path from the suggested rule, s/he would find two series to be very close. Since the rule described a complicated process in very simple terms, it became very popular very fast. 4 4 "By writing his rule in terms of the instrument actually used by central banks and expressing his formula with brilliant simplicity, Taylor made the concept of a monetary rule more palatable to central bankers-especially as he showed that recent US experience had in fact conformed to his formula rather closely." McCallum (1999b).
One could derive versions of Taylor rules as a solution to an optimization problem, where policy makers are minimizing a loss function expressed in terms of weighted average of inflation and output gap variances (Woodford, 2001 ). "The Taylor rule incorporates several features of an optimal monetary policy, from the standpoint of at least one simple class of optimizing models. The response that it prescribes to fluctuations in inflation or the output gap tends to stabilize those variables, and stabilization of both variables is an appropriate goal, at least when the output gap is properly defined."
Such rules are also widely referred to in literature as policy reaction functions, where policy makers change an instrument (in this particular case, a short term nominal interest rate)
whenever there are changes in certain economic fundamentals. Mostly the short term interest rate is a function of inflation and output gap, since these are the main variables policymakers would like to influence by changing the instrument, and these variables have been assigned to them to target, explicitly, or implicitly.
To understand the uses and abuses of Taylor rules we start by describing the original Taylor rule (1993) and presenting the modifications it suffered since then.
The Taylor rule (1993) is defined as: where i t is the instrument rate in period t, r* is the real interest rate target, π t -π* is the "inflation gap," a difference between actual inflation π t and inflation target π*, y t = logY tlogY t * is the output gap, where Y t is real GDP and Y t * is potential output, 5 and the coefficients C π and C y are positive. In original Taylor (1993) formulation C π and C y were both 0.5, the inflation and real interest rate targets were 2%, and hence the constant C was equal to 1.
The original Taylor rule has suffered various modifications as researchers were trying to make it more realistic or appropriate. We document some of these modifications as well as theoretical explanations for those modifications, and the most influential papers in the literature. We limit the presentation to the modifications of the original Taylor rule for closed economies, and those that are not based on asset prices, since these are the ones most commonly used. The final conclusions of the paper, however, are expected to apply to all types of simple monetary policy rules.
(i) One modification to the original rule was to incorporate forward looking behavior in order to avoid seeming short-sightedness of policy makers. Central banks are obviously taking into consideration a broader array of information when setting the short term interest rates, including inflation and output expectations, as noted by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998).
Meanwhile the public is forming its own rational expectations for the same variables. Romer 
Uses of Taylor Rules
Taylor rules have been used in theoretical and empirical papers, from descriptive and prescriptive points of view.
desirable, even when reduction of the magnitude of interest-rate changes is not a social objective in itself. 8 Monetary policy literature of the past three decades has focused on finding solutions for inflation bias, or time inconsistent policies. Inflation bias arises, since there is a short-run benefit from surprise inflation, when different distortions are present in the economy. The solution for the first best equilibrium would be to remove these distortions. However, this solution has not been found, as long as the society is normally concerned with the distribution of its income. Therefore other solutions have been considered. The second best equilibrium is the commitment of the central bank (monetary authority) to a monetary policy rule.
based on the rules that are either outcome of theoretical papers or the result of estimating "good/successful" periods of monetary policy.
Abuses of Taylor Rules
The potential abuses in policy prescription papers are mainly related to the choice of the benchmark rules, whether based on theoretical or empirical papers. In the two following subsections, we document and provide a brief description of the problems that might arise when choosing such rules.
Theoretical Choice of a Benchmark Rule
Policy advice based on rules from theoretical models comes from rules simulated or derived in a model or class of models considered representative for the economy. There are potential problems as documented in literature and surveyed below.
First, Svensson (2003) and Woodford (2001) warn that commitment to simple rules may not always be optimal, a fact that should be taken into account when giving policy advice. are more choices to make -annual or quarterly; if annual, then whether average of quarterly numbers or a growth rate over the 4 quarters; growth being calculated as a log-difference or a ratio, etc. Even though the differences between these various calculations could be minimal in a case of low and stable inflation, one should be aware of these caveats.
Sixth, any formula based recommendation is bound to be ignoring a judgmental element, which reflects policymakers account of other developments, not reflected in output gap or inflation behavior. 13 
Empirical Choice of a Benchmark Rule
Policy advice based on rules from empirical papers comes, usually, from estimating a period which is considered "good" or "successful" in combating inflation or in promoting output growth or both. There are several problems with such an approach as well.
To start with, Rogoff (2003) notes that it is not clear how much credit do policy makers deserve for such exceptionally good performance of many economies in the last fifteen or so years. He notes that the achievement of price stability globally may be due not only to good policy making but also to favorable macroeconomic environment. The main cause spelled out is globalization, which through increased competition has put a downward pressure on prices. Therefore considerable uncertainty surrounds monetary policy decisions, 14 and one should exercise caution when using reaction functions estimated on a changing structure of the economy to make policy recommendation for future paths of the interest rate.
Third, the coefficients might not be estimated with a very high degree of preciseness and standard errors could be quite large. Once the size of confidence intervals is taken into 14 Walsh (2003a).
account, the policy recommendations on how the instrument should be set could become rather blurred.
Again, like mentioned on page 14, any formula based recommendation is bound to be ignoring a judgmental element, which is an important factor behind policy decisions.
Finally and most importantly, can we actually properly estimate the rules? The answer is "not really," not with the methods commonly used nowadays, unless one is very careful, as the next section documents this issue in more details.
Estimating Taylor Rules
The rules are estimated using either OLS or instrumental variables, if they are backward 2. The most obvious econometrical question is how to deal with a high serial correlation of the variables. The common recipe is to estimate the rules with OLS or GMM, using NeweyWest standard errors and serial correlation robust estimators in order to account for heteroskedasticity, and instrumental variables, for the forward looking rules. What is worth noting, however, is that while papers estimating Taylor rules commonly treat interest rates as stationary series, most term structure and money demand papers treat interest rates of various maturity as I(1) series, 17 which would call for different econometrical techniques.
3. Are the estimates from simple rules reliable, and are they robust to difference in assumptions or estimators? Jondeau and others (2003) show that over the baseline period 1979-2000 alternative estimates of the Federal Reserve reaction function using several GMM 16 Minford et al, 2002 demonstrate that a Friedman type money supply policy rule is mathematically non-distinguishable from a Taylor rule. 17 King and Kurmann (2002) analyzed the term structure of the US interest rates and Baba, Hendry and Starr (1992) analyzed the US money demand. Both strands of literature found that US interest rates are stationary in first differences, therefore non stationary in levels, I(1) series. However, Mehra (1993) finds in money demand studies that US interest rates are stationary series. Moreover, Clardia, Gali and Gertler (2000) note that they treat interest rates as stationary series, "an assumption that we view as reasonable for the postwar US, even though the null of a unit root in either variables is often hard to reject at conventional significance levels in small samples like ours, given the persistence of both series and the well known low power of unit root tests." 
A similar illusionary effect, but caused by horizon misspecification, is documented
by Orphanides (2001) . "Estimation of a policy reaction with a mis-specified horizon can yield extremely misleading information regarding the responsiveness of policy to the inflation and real economic activity outlook." He shows that the policy reaction function which has forward looking behavior, but includes forecasts of less than four quarters ahead, has higher estimates for the lag of federal funds rate and output gap and lower for inflation, compared to a the specification with forecasts of four quarter ahead. One could mistake the presence of smoothing behavior, with the process described above. Intuitively, this is explained by the fact that the lag of federal funds rate and output gap become increasingly more informative for predicting inflation four quarters ahead, relative to the contribution of inflation, for the same forecast of inflation four quarters ahead.
Note that mechanics for these two illusionary effects are different: Rudebusch's or what we would like to call "a high persistence effect" arises due to high serial correlation of the variables involved: Taylor rule sets the interest rate as a function of output gap and inflation, which, being highly persistent are similar in values to their lagged values, which proxy a lagged interest rate.
Orphanides' or what we would like to call "a reduced form effect" arises due to horizon misspecification and does not necessarily require ex ante high serial correlation of the variables. It appears because expected inflation can be expressed in terms of lagged interest rate and expected inflation at a shorter horizon, thus it involves substitution of expected inflation with a formula involving lagged interest rate.
The empirical part of our paper examines this and other illusionary effects in a mathematical way, via Monte-Carlo simulations. We show how easy it is to confuse a very particular setting with something, which theoretically is very different, even though empirically the two would be very close. Our simulations demonstrate a big degree of statistical illusion, caused by serial correlation of the variables, and yielding an impression of rather sophisticated monetary policy, more sophisticated than it actually is assumed to be.
Before we proceed, as an illustration, on how different these estimated simple rules can be, even when the sample is more or elss the same, we put together the following table, which presents several versions of the Taylor rule proposed by economists for the period of late 80s
and early 90s in the US. 
Estimation of Rules Based on Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) Model

The Model
The model we use for our simulations in this section is described in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) . The model consists of two equations, a Phillips curve, where a quarterly inflation is determined by its four lags and an output gap lag; and an IS curve, where quarterly output gap is determined by its own two lags and an annual real interest rate. 20 Here we used This model is completely backward-looking, implicitly assuming adaptive expectations and has become somewhat a standard tool in policy analysis (see Romer, 2002) . The literature suggests that alternative forward-looking frameworks do not fit the observed data well unless there are some agents that are to some degree backward-looking (e.g. Ball, 2000, Roberts, 1997 and 1998).
The model assumes that policy makers can affect inflation only within two periods, as monetary policy has an effect on output gap with a one period lag, and output gap likewise affects inflation with a one period lag. 20 All quarterly variables are annualized. 21 Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)has variables de-meaned prior to estimation, so no constants appear in equations, while Rudebusch (2000) is not.
The lagged inflation coefficients in the Phillip's curve are restricted so that their sum is equal to 1. However, the results are very similar even without imposing this restriction.
Finally, note that the model implies an equilibrium real interest rate of 2.11 percent.
To close the model, we assume that the policy maker sets the quarterly interest rate according to a Taylor rule as follows:
As you can see, the rule is very similar to the one proposed in Taylor (1993) . It differs in two instances. First, the constant is slightly higher, as the equilibrium real interest rate implied by the model is higher than 2 percent assumed by Taylor. Second, the interest rate responds to the quarterly lags on the fundamentals, rather than their contemporaneous values, as those reflect the latest information, which policy makers can actually observe (McCallum, 19997 ). Inflation target is assumed to be 2 percent, similar to Taylor (1993) .
This rule can be characterized as "naïve to the fourth degree." First, the monetary policy setting is explained by only two fundamentals -output gap and inflation. Second, the monetary policy setting is backward, with a short term interest rate reacting only to the latest observed values of the fundamentals. Third, the rule assumes that a policy maker ignores possible data measurement errors. And finally, the rule is completely mechanical, with no judgmental element being present.
Simulations
Before simulations begin, two normally distributed random series are generated, which correspond to output gap and inflation shocks.
It is assumed that for the first four periods the economy is in the steady state with output gap at 0, inflation at 2 percent, and the interest rate at 4.11 percent (2 percent plus equilibrium real interest rate).
Overall, 1000 periods are simulated and the last 970 are used for estimations.
Simulations and regressions are being run 500 times and averages of the estimated coefficients, standard errors, adjusted R squared, Durbin-Watson statistics and Sum of Squared Residuals are reported in the outcome tables.
We use obtained data in order to see if our estimations would allow us to identify the policy rule as it is or if they document an illusionary presence of more sophisticated versions of the Taylor rule -ones which are forecast based, have an embedded interest rate smoothing, or respond to growth rates of the fundamentals.
Estimations
We estimate the rules using first lags, contemporaneous fundamentals, and leads of second and fourth order, using a simple functional form and with additional variables, such as lagged interest rate, output gap growth, and inflation differential.
When evaluating the rules with correctly specified timing of the fundamentals, both OLS and GMM methods correctly identify the coefficients of the rule, assigning 0 values to every additional variable, such as lagged interest rate, inflation differential, and output gap growth. We obtain adjusted R-squared of 1.0 and sum of squared residuals of 0.0. DurbinWatson statistics is 2.0.
However, when the rules with incorrectly specified timing of the fundamentals are evaluated, both methods produce incorrect assessment. The rows in bold in the table reflect that the rule used to simulate the data had that particular form, interest rate was determined by inflation and output gap lag.
Next we estimate a rule where policy maker smoothes the path for the interest rate, having in mind interest rate target as prescribed by the "original" Taylor rule, but constraining him/herself with avoiding big jumps in the value of the instrument: 
Such a setting fits perfectly with our understanding of the monetary policy-it is forward looking, sufficiently active in responding to inflation and output gap, moving instrument variable cautiously, and having a judgmental element in it. Good fit would allow to produce nice charts and reasonable historical evidence.
In the economic literature, the coefficient on the lagged interest rates is usually estimated to be surprisingly high, around 0.7-0.8 (see Rudebusch, 2000) and quite a few papers have been written trying to explain this over-cautiousness of the central bankers. Our results suggest that such carefulness could be just a statistical illusion, and in some cases it could be caused by mis-specification of the rule, in particular by incorrectly specifying timing of the fundamentals.
In addition, we can suggest several other rules, which fit data as well as any of the already described ones. Similar to The results are rather straightforward. Neither of these two factors has a significant impact on the outcome. One impact of a presence of the real time error is the dispersal across 500 simulations sharply increases, though remaining very small in absolute terms.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we document the history of Taylor rules (in closed economies) in the current literature, and second, we illustrate illusionary effects that may emerge when estimating them.
We describe uses (descriptive and prescriptive) and, more importantly, potential abuses of Taylor rules. The latter emerge when Taylor rules (and in general simple policy rules) are being used as a guide for policy makers, and not enough attention is paid to the fact that the rules are likely to be not optimal, mis-specified, or incorrectly estimated.
When it comes to policy descriptions, consensus has not been reached on the details of the specification for the US data, although most analysts and policymakers agree on the fundamental features of a monetary policy rule (Kozicki, 1999) . Given the lack of consensus in the descriptive papers, one would suggest caution for the prescriptive uses of a Taylor rule, for any country.
Moreover, when it comes to prescriptive papers, the conclusions that have been reached in the literature suggest that simple rules should not be followed mechanically (Taylor 1993 (Taylor , 2000 , but rather used as "guidelines," exercising judgment.
Policymakers embraced this conclusion. Greenspan The results demonstrate that there is a big degree of statistical illusion, caused by serial correlation of the variables, and yielding an impression of rather sophisticated monetary policy, more sophisticated than it actually is assumed to be -one which is forward looking and takes into account additional factors. 23 The results of this paper also suggest that there could be "too big" conclusions drawn based on "too little" evidence. As monetary policy rules are widely used these days to gauge policy makers, improper recommendations made on their basis could be harmful. Thus, it becomes very important to ensure the awareness of the drawbacks and imprecision of such rules. While it is fine that different policy rules are used to describe the same process empirically, one should be very careful when making statements about the nature of the policy making process, and therefore policy advice should be dispensed with caution.
The paper does not represent a criticism to the simple policy rules literature, but draws attention to inconsistencies in estimating them, and more importantly, to how one could best formulate policy advice, given their potential shortcomings, as documented by theoretical and empirical studies.
